[Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] Require creation time to be unique and hashed (PR #1912)

[Demi Marie Obenour]

@DemiMarie commented on this pull request.



>  	    impl = *p;
-	    if (!(_digp->saved & PGPDIG_SAVED_TIME) &&
-		(sigtype == PGPSIGTYPE_POSITIVE_CERT || sigtype == PGPSIGTYPE_BINARY || sigtype == PGPSIGTYPE_TEXT || sigtype == PGPSIGTYPE_STANDALONE))

@teythoon _All_ of your criticisms are valid.  Fixing RPM’s implementation is a _massive_ amount of work, though.  So I am trying to do the best I can in my spare time.

Right now, for example, I am not even sure where RPM should _store_ revocation information.  In the rpmdb?  In the filesystem somewhere?

> > > * the subkey is marked as signing-capable?
> > 
> > RPM does not know either of these. I actually consider this to be a security vulnerability, but I do not know if upstream does. In any case there is no point in an embargo since this is already public.
> 
> It is a security vulnerability, but upstream disagrees.

Have you made a report to <secalert at redhat.com>?

> I have written the most comprehensive OpenPGP test suite ever created that found countless bugs across multiple implementations.

Is this test suite open source?  I would like to use it to test rpm-oxide’s signature parsing code.

> `gpgv` canonicalizes certificates. Not doing so is unsafe. Saying RPM implements a subset of that is like saying `/bin/true` implements a subset of `gpgv`.

Is there a specification for certificate canonicalization anywhere?

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